test(handlers/mcp): harden RecallMemory_GlobalScope test — assert OFFSEC-001 scrub contract (mc#681) #693
@@ -608,7 +608,13 @@ func TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_CleanContent_PassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
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// tools/call — recall_memory
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// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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func TestMCPHandler_RecallMemory_GlobalScope_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
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// TestMCPHandler_RecallMemory_GlobalScope_Blocked_ScrubsInternalError verifies
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// C3 (GLOBAL scope blocked on MCP bridge) is enforced and that the OFFSEC-001
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// scrub contract applies: the client-visible error.message is the constant
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// "tool call failed", NOT the descriptive internal reason. The internal reason
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// ("GLOBAL scope is not permitted via the MCP bridge") is logged server-side
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// but must never reach the wire.
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func TestMCPHandler_RecallMemory_GlobalScope_Blocked_ScrubsInternalError(t *testing.T) {
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h, mock := newMCPHandler(t)
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// No DB expectations — handler must abort before touching the DB.
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@@ -626,10 +632,38 @@ func TestMCPHandler_RecallMemory_GlobalScope_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
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})
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var resp mcpResponse
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json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp)
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if resp.Error == nil {
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t.Error("expected JSON-RPC error for GLOBAL scope recall, got nil")
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if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("response is not valid JSON: %v", err)
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}
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// (1) C3: an error must be reported.
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if resp.Error == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected JSON-RPC error for GLOBAL scope recall, got nil")
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}
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// (2) OFFSEC-001 positive assertions — exact equality on the scrubbed
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// constants so any change (re-leak of err.Error(), code mutation) trips
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// the test.
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if resp.Error.Code != -32000 {
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t.Errorf("error code should be -32000 (Server error / dispatch-failure), got: %d", resp.Error.Code)
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}
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if resp.Error.Message != "tool call failed" {
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t.Errorf("error message should be the OFFSEC-001 constant %q, got: %q", "tool call failed", resp.Error.Message)
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}
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// (3) OFFSEC-001 negative assertions — the internal reason must NOT appear
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// in the client-visible message.
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leakedTokens := []string{
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"GLOBAL", // scope name
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"scope", // policy lexicon
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"permitted", // policy verb
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"bridge", // internal architecture term
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"LOCAL", // alternative scope name
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"TEAM", // alternative scope name
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}
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for _, tok := range leakedTokens {
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if bytes.Contains([]byte(resp.Error.Message), []byte(tok)) {
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t.Errorf("OFFSEC-001 scrub regression: client-visible error.message leaks internal token %q (got: %q)", tok, resp.Error.Message)
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}
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}
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// (4) C3 invariant preserved: handler must short-circuit before any DB call.
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if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("unexpected DB calls on GLOBAL scope block: %v", err)
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}
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