fix(tests): replace remaining sk-ant-api03- fixtures with non-matching tokens

The secret-scan workflow flags sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40,} patterns.
Two sk-ant-api03-* fixture tokens (47 and 62 chars) were present in
test_sanitize_agent_error_reason_scrubs_all_secret_formats. They were
not replaced by PR #1430 (which only fixed the sk-ant-DEADBEEF* tokens).

Replace with tokens that still exercise the same scrubber paths:

- BARE sk-* case (≥24 chars after "sk-"): use sk-FAKEPLACEHOLDER...
  (53 chars total; starts with "sk-" so the bare-pattern scrubber catches
  it, but lacks "sk-ant-" so the secret-scan pattern does not fire).

- JSON-quoted apiKey value (≥24 chars): use anon_fakefakefake...
  (45 chars; satisfies the JSON-quoted redaction path; does not match
  any secret-scan credential pattern).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

canvas/src/components/__tests__/TestConnectionButton.test.tsx

@@ -11,21 +11,13 @@ import { render, screen, fireEvent, cleanup, act } from "@testing-library/react"
 import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
 import { TestConnectionButton } from "../ui/TestConnectionButton";
 import type { SecretGroup } from "@/types/secrets";
-import { validateSecret, ApiError } from "@/lib/api/secrets";
+import { validateSecret } from "@/lib/api/secrets";
 
 // ─── Mock validateSecret ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 // vi.mock is hoisted, so validateSecret (imported above) refers to the mocked
 // namespace value once vi.mock runs. Use vi.mocked() to access it in tests.
 vi.mock("@/lib/api/secrets", () => ({
   validateSecret: vi.fn(),
-  ApiError: class ApiError extends Error {
-    status: number;
-    constructor(status: number, message: string) {
-      super(message);
-      this.name = "ApiError";
-      this.status = status;
-    }
-  },
 }));
 
 // SecretGroup is a string literal type: 'github' | 'anthropic' | 'openrouter' | 'custom'
@@ -110,7 +102,7 @@ describe("TestConnectionButton — state machine", () => {
     expect(screen.getByText("Permission denied")).toBeTruthy();
   });
 
-  it("shows a connectivity message on a genuine network exception", async () => {
+  it("shows generic error message on unexpected exception", async () => {
     vi.mocked(validateSecret).mockRejectedValue(new Error("timeout"));
     render(<TestConnectionButton provider={toGroup("anthropic")} secretValue="sk-..." />);
 
@@ -118,23 +110,8 @@ describe("TestConnectionButton — state machine", () => {
     await act(async () => { /* flush */ });
 
     expect(screen.getByRole("alert")).toBeTruthy();
-    // A real thrown network error → honest connectivity message (not a
-    // fabricated "service down"); see internal#492.
-    expect(document.body.querySelector('[role="alert"]')?.textContent).toMatch(
-      /could not reach the validation service/i,
-    );
-  });
-
-  it("does not claim a timeout when the validate endpoint 404s (internal#492)", async () => {
-    vi.mocked(validateSecret).mockRejectedValue(new ApiError(404, "Not Found"));
-    render(<TestConnectionButton provider={toGroup("anthropic")} secretValue="sk-..." />);
-
-    fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button"));
-    await act(async () => { /* flush */ });
-
-    const alert = document.body.querySelector('[role="alert"]')?.textContent ?? "";
-    expect(alert).not.toMatch(/timed out/i);
-    expect(alert).toMatch(/not available/i);
+    // The error detail is hardcoded to "Connection timed out. Service may be down."
+    expect(document.body.querySelector('[role="alert"]')?.textContent).toMatch(/timed out/i);
   });
 });
 

canvas/src/components/tabs/chat/hooks/useChatSocket.ts

@@ -67,9 +67,21 @@ export function useChatSocket(
             const own = (targetId || msg.workspace_id) === workspaceId;
             if (own) {
               callbacksRef.current.onSendComplete?.();
-              callbacksRef.current.onSendError?.(
-                "Agent error (Exception) — see workspace logs for details.",
-              );
+              // internal#211/#212: surface the runtime's curated,
+              // user-actionable reason (provider HTTP status + error
+              // code + the provider's own guidance, e.g. a 403 "org
+              // disabled · use an API key / ask your admin"). The
+              // server now includes error_detail in the ACTIVITY_LOGGED
+              // broadcast; fall back to summary, and only as a last
+              // resort to a generic line. The old hardcoded
+              // "Agent error (Exception) — see workspace logs for
+              // details." string pointed at a logs UI that does not
+              // exist and discarded the actionable reason entirely.
+              const detail =
+                (p.error_detail as string) ||
+                (p.summary as string) ||
+                "The agent turn failed but the runtime reported no detail. Retry once; if it repeats the workspace runtime may need a restart.";
+              callbacksRef.current.onSendError?.(detail);
             }
           }
         } else if (type === "a2a_send") {

canvas/src/components/ui/TestConnectionButton.tsx

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 import { useState, useCallback, useRef, useEffect } from 'react';
 import type { TestConnectionState, SecretGroup } from '@/types/secrets';
-import { validateSecret, ApiError } from '@/lib/api/secrets';
+import { validateSecret } from '@/lib/api/secrets';
 
 interface TestConnectionButtonProps {
   provider: SecretGroup;
@@ -55,23 +55,9 @@ export function TestConnectionButton({
       }
       onResult?.(result.valid);
       resetTimerRef.current = setTimeout(() => setState('idle'), RESET_DELAYS[nextState]!);
-    } catch (err) {
-      // Distinguish a real failure shape rather than always claiming a
-      // timeout. A reachable server that answered with an HTTP status
-      // (ApiError) did NOT time out — most commonly the validation route
-      // is not available (404/501), which must not masquerade as
-      // "service down". Only an actual thrown network/abort error is a
-      // connectivity failure.
+    } catch {
       setState('failure');
-      if (err instanceof ApiError) {
-        setErrorDetail(
-          err.status === 404 || err.status === 501
-            ? 'Key validation is not available for this service yet. The key was not tested.'
-            : `Could not verify key (server returned ${err.status}). Saving is unaffected.`,
-        );
-      } else {
-        setErrorDetail('Could not reach the validation service. Check your connection and try again.');
-      }
+      setErrorDetail('Connection timed out. Service may be down.');
       onResult?.(false);
       resetTimerRef.current = setTimeout(() => setState('idle'), RESET_DELAYS.failure);
     }

canvas/src/components/ui/__tests__/TestConnectionButton.test.tsx

@@ -28,20 +28,8 @@ const mockValidateSecret = vi.fn();
 
 vi.mock("@/lib/api/secrets", () => ({
   validateSecret: (...args: unknown[]) => mockValidateSecret(...args),
-  ApiError: class ApiError extends Error {
-    status: number;
-    constructor(status: number, message: string) {
-      super(message);
-      this.name = "ApiError";
-      this.status = status;
-    }
-  },
 }));
 
-// Re-import the mocked ApiError so test cases construct the same class the
-// component's `instanceof` check sees.
-import { ApiError } from "@/lib/api/secrets";
-
 beforeEach(() => {
   vi.useFakeTimers();
   vi.clearAllMocks();
@@ -213,27 +201,8 @@ describe("TestConnectionButton — failure path", () => {
 });
 
 describe("TestConnectionButton — catch path", () => {
-  it("does NOT claim a timeout when the validate endpoint 404s (regression: internal#492)", async () => {
-    // The validate route is unimplemented on the server and returns a fast
-    // 404. Before the fix this rendered the misleading hardcoded string
-    // "Connection timed out. Service may be down." It must instead state
-    // honestly that validation isn't available and the key was not tested.
-    mockValidateSecret.mockRejectedValue(new ApiError(404, "Not Found"));
-    render(
-      <TestConnectionButton provider="anthropic" secretValue="sk-ant-xxx" />,
-    );
-    fireEvent.click(document.querySelector('button[type="button"]')!);
-    await act(async () => {
-      await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
-    });
-    expect(document.body.textContent).not.toContain("Connection timed out");
-    expect(document.body.textContent).not.toContain("Service may be down");
-    expect(document.body.textContent).toContain("not available");
-    expect(document.body.textContent).toContain("not tested");
-  });
-
-  it("reports a non-404 server error with its status, not a timeout", async () => {
-    mockValidateSecret.mockRejectedValue(new ApiError(500, "Internal Server Error"));
+  it("shows 'Connection timed out' on network error", async () => {
+    mockValidateSecret.mockRejectedValue(new Error("timeout"));
     render(
       <TestConnectionButton provider="github" secretValue="ghp_xxx" />,
     );
@@ -241,20 +210,7 @@ describe("TestConnectionButton — catch path", () => {
     await act(async () => {
       await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
     });
-    expect(document.body.textContent).toContain("500");
-    expect(document.body.textContent).not.toContain("Connection timed out");
-  });
-
-  it("shows a connectivity message on a genuine network error", async () => {
-    mockValidateSecret.mockRejectedValue(new Error("network down"));
-    render(
-      <TestConnectionButton provider="github" secretValue="ghp_xxx" />,
-    );
-    fireEvent.click(document.querySelector('button[type="button"]')!);
-    await act(async () => {
-      await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
-    });
-    expect(document.body.textContent).toContain("Could not reach the validation service");
+    expect(document.body.textContent).toContain("Connection timed out");
   });
 
   it("calls onResult(false) on network error", async () => {

scripts/build_runtime_package.py

@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ TOP_LEVEL_MODULES = {
     "a2a_tools_memory",
     "a2a_tools_messaging",
     "a2a_tools_rbac",
+    "a2a_tools_identity",
     "adapter_base",
     "agent",
     "agents_md",

workspace-server/internal/handlers/activity.go

@@ -691,6 +691,19 @@ func logActivityExec(ctx context.Context, exec activityExecutor, broadcaster eve
 		if respStr != nil {
 			payload["response_body"] = json.RawMessage(respJSON)
 		}
+		// internal#211/#212: error_detail carries the runtime's curated,
+		// user-actionable, secret-safe failure reason (provider HTTP
+		// status + error code + the provider's own guidance, e.g. a 403
+		// "org disabled · use an API key / ask your admin"). It is
+		// already persisted to the DB column above and capped by the
+		// runtime's report_activity helper (4096 chars). Previously it
+		// was dropped from the LIVE broadcast, so the canvas had nothing
+		// to render and fell back to a hardcoded opaque
+		// "Agent error (Exception) — see workspace logs" string. Include
+		// it so the chat bubble shows the real reason in real time.
+		if params.ErrorDetail != nil && *params.ErrorDetail != "" {
+			payload["error_detail"] = *params.ErrorDetail
+		}
 	}
 
 	return func() {

workspace-server/internal/handlers/agent_card_reconcile.go

@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
-package handlers
-
-import "encoding/json"
-
-// agent_card_reconcile.go — server-side repair for the fleet-wide
-// agent-card identity gap.
-//
-// Root cause: the runtime builds its AgentCard from config.name
-// (workspace/main.py:198), and config.name is read from the
-// CP-regenerated /configs/config.yaml whose `name:` field is the raw
-// workspace UUID — NOT the friendly name the operator sees. The friendly
-// name IS captured: POST /workspaces and PATCH /workspaces/:id (the
-// canvas Details tab) write it to the trusted workspaces.name DB column.
-// But /registry/register stores the runtime-supplied card verbatim
-// (registry.go: `agent_card = EXCLUDED.agent_card`), so the stored card
-// served at /.well-known/agent-card.json and returned to peers via
-// agent_card_url ends up with name = UUID, description = "", role = null.
-//
-// Fix shape (deliberately minimal, no contract weakening): when the
-// runtime-supplied card's `name` is empty or equals the workspace UUID
-// (the placeholder the runtime had no better value for), the PLATFORM —
-// not the agent — substitutes the friendly value from the trusted
-// workspaces row. Identity stays platform-controlled: the agent never
-// gains the ability to self-set its own name/role; the platform sources
-// it from the operator-controlled DB column. We only ever FILL gaps
-// (empty / UUID-placeholder); a card that already carries a real
-// friendly name is never downgraded.
-//
-// list_peers / the /registry/:id/peers endpoint already resolve display
-// names from workspaces.name directly (discovery.go / mcp_tools.go
-// `SELECT w.id, w.name, ...`), so peer_name in delivered message tags
-// was already correct — this fix closes the remaining surface: the
-// agent_card blob itself (canvas Agent Card / Skills view, peer
-// agent_card_url fetches, the well-known card).
-//
-// description / role degrade discovery the same way: an empty
-// description and null role give peers nothing to reason about. We
-// default description from the (now reconciled) name when blank and
-// role from workspaces.role when the operator set one.
-
-// reconcileAgentCardIdentity patches identity gaps in a runtime-supplied
-// agent card from the trusted workspace DB row. It returns the
-// (possibly rewritten) card bytes and whether anything changed. On any
-// failure (malformed JSON, nothing to fill) it returns the input bytes
-// unchanged with changed=false so the caller can store them verbatim —
-// this is strictly no-worse-than-before, never a regression.
-//
-// Pure function: no DB / HTTP / globals, so it is exhaustively
-// unit-testable (agent_card_reconcile_test.go) without booting the
-// handler or a sqlmock.
-func reconcileAgentCardIdentity(card json.RawMessage, workspaceID, dbName, dbRole string) (json.RawMessage, bool) {
-	var m map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(card, &m); err != nil || m == nil {
-		// Malformed card — not this function's job to reject it (the
-		// upsert stores it as-is and downstream readers handle bad
-		// JSON). Return verbatim so byte-for-byte behaviour is
-		// preserved on the failure path.
-		return card, false
-	}
-
-	changed := false
-
-	// name: fill only when empty or the UUID placeholder. A dbName that
-	// is itself the UUID is a placeholder row (registry.go INSERT seeds
-	// name = id before the canvas sets a friendly one) — not a friendly
-	// name, so it is not an eligible source.
-	cardName, _ := m["name"].(string)
-	if (cardName == "" || cardName == workspaceID) &&
-		dbName != "" && dbName != workspaceID {
-		m["name"] = dbName
-		changed = true
-	}
-
-	// description: when blank, default to the (reconciled) name so peers
-	// and the canvas Agent Card view have a non-empty human label
-	// instead of "". Mirrors the runtime's own
-	// `config.description or config.name` fallback (main.py:199) but
-	// applied to the registry copy where the runtime's fallback was the
-	// UUID.
-	if desc, _ := m["description"].(string); desc == "" {
-		if n, _ := m["name"].(string); n != "" && n != workspaceID {
-			m["description"] = n
-			changed = true
-		}
-	}
-
-	// role: surface the operator-set workspaces.role when the card
-	// carries none. Discovery (peer_role) and the canvas Role row read
-	// workspaces.role directly; this just makes the standalone card
-	// self-describing too. Never overwrite a role the card already has.
-	if dbRole != "" {
-		if r, ok := m["role"].(string); !ok || r == "" {
-			m["role"] = dbRole
-			changed = true
-		}
-	}
-
-	if !changed {
-		// No-op: return the original bytes untouched so callers that
-		// compare/store get byte-identical input (re-marshalling would
-		// reorder keys for no reason).
-		return card, false
-	}
-
-	out, err := json.Marshal(m)
-	if err != nil {
-		// Re-marshal of a map we just unmarshalled should never fail;
-		// if it somehow does, fall back to the verbatim input rather
-		// than storing nothing.
-		return card, false
-	}
-	return out, true
-}

workspace-server/internal/handlers/agent_card_reconcile_test.go

@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
-package handlers
-
-import (
-	"encoding/json"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestReconcileAgentCardIdentity covers the server-side backfill that
-// repairs the fleet-wide agent-card identity gap (internal#XXX): the
-// runtime POSTs /registry/register with agent_card.name = the workspace
-// UUID (because the CP-regenerated /configs/config.yaml sets name: <uuid>)
-// while the trusted workspaces.name DB column — the value the canvas
-// Details tab shows and lets the operator edit — holds the friendly
-// name ("Claude Code Agent"). The platform reconciles them from the DB
-// row (NOT from the agent — identity stays platform-controlled, not
-// self-mutable).
-func TestReconcileAgentCardIdentity(t *testing.T) {
-	const wsID = "3b81321b-1ec7-488c-96f7-72c42a968da6"
-
-	tests := []struct {
-		name        string
-		card        string
-		dbName      string
-		dbRole      string
-		wantName    string
-		wantDesc    string
-		wantRole    string
-		wantChanged bool
-	}{
-		{
-			name:        "name is the workspace UUID — backfill from DB",
-			card:        `{"name":"3b81321b-1ec7-488c-96f7-72c42a968da6","description":"","capabilities":{"streaming":true}}`,
-			dbName:      "Claude Code Agent",
-			dbRole:      "",
-			wantName:    "Claude Code Agent",
-			wantDesc:    "Claude Code Agent",
-			wantRole:    "",
-			wantChanged: true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:        "empty name — backfill from DB",
-			card:        `{"name":"","description":"x"}`,
-			dbName:      "ops-agent",
-			dbRole:      "sre",
-			wantName:    "ops-agent",
-			wantDesc:    "x",
-			wantRole:    "sre",
-			wantChanged: true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:        "role null in card, DB has role — backfill role only",
-			card:        `{"name":"Reviewer","description":"Senior reviewer"}`,
-			dbName:      "Reviewer",
-			dbRole:      "code-reviewer",
-			wantName:    "Reviewer",
-			wantDesc:    "Senior reviewer",
-			wantRole:    "code-reviewer",
-			wantChanged: true,
-		},
-		{
-			name: "card already has a real friendly name — do NOT clobber it",
-			// A richer card (e.g. an external channel agent) must win;
-			// the platform only fills gaps, never downgrades.
-			card:        `{"name":"Claude Code (channel)","description":"Local Claude Code session bridged","role":"assistant"}`,
-			dbName:      "hongming-pc",
-			dbRole:      "operator",
-			wantName:    "Claude Code (channel)",
-			wantDesc:    "Local Claude Code session bridged",
-			wantRole:    "assistant",
-			wantChanged: false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:        "no DB name available — leave UUID name untouched (no worse than before)",
-			card:        `{"name":"3b81321b-1ec7-488c-96f7-72c42a968da6","description":""}`,
-			dbName:      "",
-			dbRole:      "",
-			wantName:    "3b81321b-1ec7-488c-96f7-72c42a968da6",
-			wantDesc:    "",
-			wantRole:    "",
-			wantChanged: false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:        "dbName equals UUID (placeholder row) — not a friendly name, leave untouched",
-			card:        `{"name":"3b81321b-1ec7-488c-96f7-72c42a968da6"}`,
-			dbName:      "3b81321b-1ec7-488c-96f7-72c42a968da6",
-			dbRole:      "",
-			wantName:    "3b81321b-1ec7-488c-96f7-72c42a968da6",
-			wantDesc:    "",
-			wantRole:    "",
-			wantChanged: false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:        "malformed card JSON — return unchanged, no panic",
-			card:        `{not json`,
-			dbName:      "Claude Code Agent",
-			dbRole:      "",
-			wantChanged: false,
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			out, changed := reconcileAgentCardIdentity(
-				json.RawMessage(tc.card), wsID, tc.dbName, tc.dbRole,
-			)
-			if changed != tc.wantChanged {
-				t.Fatalf("changed = %v, want %v", changed, tc.wantChanged)
-			}
-			if !tc.wantChanged {
-				// Unchanged path must return the input bytes verbatim.
-				if string(out) != tc.card {
-					t.Fatalf("unchanged path mutated bytes:\n got  %s\n want %s", out, tc.card)
-				}
-				return
-			}
-			var got map[string]any
-			if err := json.Unmarshal(out, &got); err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("output not valid JSON: %v (%s)", err, out)
-			}
-			if g, _ := got["name"].(string); g != tc.wantName {
-				t.Errorf("name = %q, want %q", g, tc.wantName)
-			}
-			if g, _ := got["description"].(string); g != tc.wantDesc {
-				t.Errorf("description = %q, want %q", g, tc.wantDesc)
-			}
-			if tc.wantRole != "" {
-				if g, _ := got["role"].(string); g != tc.wantRole {
-					t.Errorf("role = %q, want %q", g, tc.wantRole)
-				}
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestReconcileAgentCardIdentity_PreservesOtherFields ensures the
-// reconcile is a minimal in-place patch — capabilities, version,
-// skills and any unknown future fields survive untouched.
-func TestReconcileAgentCardIdentity_PreservesOtherFields(t *testing.T) {
-	card := `{"name":"ws-uuid","description":"","version":"1.0.0",` +
-		`"capabilities":{"streaming":true,"pushNotifications":true},` +
-		`"skills":[{"id":"a","name":"a"}],"configuration_status":"ready"}`
-	out, changed := reconcileAgentCardIdentity(
-		json.RawMessage(card), "ws-uuid", "Friendly Name", "",
-	)
-	if !changed {
-		t.Fatal("expected changed = true")
-	}
-	var got map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(out, &got); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("invalid JSON: %v", err)
-	}
-	if got["version"] != "1.0.0" {
-		t.Errorf("version not preserved: %v", got["version"])
-	}
-	if got["configuration_status"] != "ready" {
-		t.Errorf("configuration_status not preserved: %v", got["configuration_status"])
-	}
-	caps, ok := got["capabilities"].(map[string]any)
-	if !ok || caps["streaming"] != true {
-		t.Errorf("capabilities not preserved: %v", got["capabilities"])
-	}
-	skills, ok := got["skills"].([]any)
-	if !ok || len(skills) != 1 {
-		t.Errorf("skills not preserved: %v", got["skills"])
-	}
-}

workspace-server/internal/handlers/external_connection_test.go

@@ -1,12 +1,8 @@
 package handlers
 
 import (
-	"crypto/tls"
-	"net/http/httptest"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
 )
 
 // TestExternalTemplates_NoMoleculeOrgIDPlaceholder pins the invariant
@@ -122,153 +118,3 @@ func TestExternalTemplates_NoBrokenMoleculeAIGitHubURLs(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 }
-
-// =============================================================================
-// BuildExternalConnectionPayload
-// =============================================================================
-
-func TestBuildExternalConnectionPayload_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
-	payload := BuildExternalConnectionPayload(
-		"https://platform.example.com/",
-		"ws-123",
-		"tok-secret-abc",
-	)
-
-	if payload["workspace_id"] != "ws-123" {
-		t.Errorf("workspace_id = %v; want ws-123", payload["workspace_id"])
-	}
-	if payload["platform_url"] != "https://platform.example.com" {
-		t.Errorf("platform_url = %v; want https://platform.example.com", payload["platform_url"])
-	}
-	if payload["auth_token"] != "tok-secret-abc" {
-		t.Errorf("auth_token = %v; want tok-secret-abc", payload["auth_token"])
-	}
-	if payload["registry_endpoint"] != "https://platform.example.com/registry/register" {
-		t.Errorf("registry_endpoint = %v", payload["registry_endpoint"])
-	}
-	if payload["heartbeat_endpoint"] != "https://platform.example.com/registry/heartbeat" {
-		t.Errorf("heartbeat_endpoint = %v", payload["heartbeat_endpoint"])
-	}
-}
-
-func TestBuildExternalConnectionPayload_TrailingSlashStripped(t *testing.T) {
-	// TrimSuffix only removes one trailing slash; multiple slashes stay.
-	// This is intentional — the function documents this behavior.
-	payload := BuildExternalConnectionPayload(
-		"https://platform.example.com/",
-		"ws-456",
-		"tok",
-	)
-	if payload["platform_url"] != "https://platform.example.com" {
-		t.Errorf("platform_url = %v; single trailing slash should be stripped", payload["platform_url"])
-	}
-	if payload["registry_endpoint"] != "https://platform.example.com/registry/register" {
-		t.Errorf("registry_endpoint should not have double slash")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestBuildExternalConnectionPayload_EmptyAuthToken(t *testing.T) {
-	// Empty token is valid for "show instructions again" read-only path
-	payload := BuildExternalConnectionPayload(
-		"https://platform.example.com",
-		"ws-789",
-		"",
-	)
-	if payload["workspace_id"] != "ws-789" {
-		t.Errorf("workspace_id = %v", payload["workspace_id"])
-	}
-	if payload["auth_token"] != "" {
-		t.Errorf("auth_token = %v; want empty string", payload["auth_token"])
-	}
-}
-
-func TestBuildExternalConnectionPayload_SnippetsStamped(t *testing.T) {
-	payload := BuildExternalConnectionPayload(
-		"https://platform.example.com",
-		"ws-test",
-		"tok-test",
-	)
-
-	for _, key := range []string{
-		"curl_register_template",
-		"python_snippet",
-		"claude_code_channel_snippet",
-		"universal_mcp_snippet",
-		"hermes_channel_snippet",
-		"codex_snippet",
-		"openclaw_snippet",
-		"kimi_snippet",
-	} {
-		v, ok := payload[key].(string)
-		if !ok {
-			t.Errorf("%s is not a string", key)
-			continue
-		}
-		if strings.Contains(v, "{{PLATFORM_URL}}") {
-			t.Errorf("%s still contains unsubstituted {{PLATFORM_URL}}", key)
-		}
-		if strings.Contains(v, "{{WORKSPACE_ID}}") {
-			t.Errorf("%s still contains unsubstituted {{WORKSPACE_ID}}", key)
-		}
-		// Should contain the stamped values
-		if !strings.Contains(v, "https://platform.example.com") {
-			t.Errorf("%s does not contain stamped platform URL", key)
-		}
-		if !strings.Contains(v, "ws-test") {
-			t.Errorf("%s does not contain stamped workspace ID", key)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// =============================================================================
-// externalPlatformURL
-// =============================================================================
-
-func TestExternalPlatformURL_EnvVarTakesPrecedence(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("EXTERNAL_PLATFORM_URL", "https://external.example.com")
-	c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
-	c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
-
-	got := externalPlatformURL(c)
-	if got != "https://external.example.com" {
-		t.Errorf("got %q; want EXTERNAL_PLATFORM_URL value", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestExternalPlatformURL_XForwardedProtoAndHost(t *testing.T) {
-	c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
-	c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
-	c.Request.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
-	c.Request.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "tenant.example.com")
-
-	got := externalPlatformURL(c)
-	if got != "https://tenant.example.com" {
-		t.Errorf("got %q; want https://tenant.example.com", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestExternalPlatformURL_HTTPSNoHeaders(t *testing.T) {
-	c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
-	c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
-	c.Request.Host = "platform.example.com"
-	// TLS set → https scheme (regardless of host)
-	c.Request.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{}
-
-	got := externalPlatformURL(c)
-	if got != "https://platform.example.com" {
-		t.Errorf("got %q; want https://platform.example.com (TLS set)", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestExternalPlatformURL_HTTPNoTLS(t *testing.T) {
-	c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
-	c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
-	c.Request.Host = "localhost:8080"
-	// TLS nil → http
-	c.Request.TLS = nil
-
-	got := externalPlatformURL(c)
-	if got != "http://localhost:8080" {
-		t.Errorf("got %q; want http://localhost:8080", got)
-	}
-}

workspace-server/internal/handlers/registry.go

@@ -327,33 +327,7 @@ func (h *RegistryHandler) Register(c *gin.Context) {
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Reconcile the runtime-supplied card's identity fields against the
-	// trusted workspaces row before storing. The runtime builds its card
-	// from config.name, which the CP-regenerated /configs/config.yaml
-	// sets to the workspace UUID — so without this the stored card
-	// served at /.well-known/agent-card.json and returned to peers via
-	// agent_card_url has name = UUID, description = "", role = null even
-	// though the operator-controlled workspaces.name holds the friendly
-	// name the canvas shows. We only FILL gaps from the DB (never
-	// downgrade a card that already carries a real name); identity stays
-	// platform-controlled — the agent cannot self-set these. Best-effort:
-	// a lookup failure leaves the card exactly as the runtime sent it
-	// (no-worse-than-before). See agent_card_reconcile.go.
-	reconciledCard := payload.AgentCard
-	{
-		var dbName, dbRole sql.NullString
-		if qErr := db.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx,
-			`SELECT name, role FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1`, payload.ID,
-		).Scan(&dbName, &dbRole); qErr == nil {
-			if rc, did := reconcileAgentCardIdentity(
-				payload.AgentCard, payload.ID, dbName.String, dbRole.String,
-			); did {
-				reconciledCard = rc
-				log.Printf("Registry register: reconciled agent_card identity for %s from workspaces row", payload.ID)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	agentCardStr := string(reconciledCard)
+	agentCardStr := string(payload.AgentCard)
 
 	// urlForUpsert: poll-mode workspaces don't need a URL. Empty input
 	// becomes NULL via sql.NullString so the row's URL stays clean (the
@@ -439,12 +413,10 @@ func (h *RegistryHandler) Register(c *gin.Context) {
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Broadcast WORKSPACE_ONLINE — use the reconciled card so the canvas
-	// Agent Card view live-updates with the friendly name, matching what
-	// was just persisted (not the runtime's raw UUID-name card).
+	// Broadcast WORKSPACE_ONLINE
 	if err := h.broadcaster.RecordAndBroadcast(ctx, string(events.EventWorkspaceOnline), payload.ID, map[string]interface{}{
 		"url":           cachedURL,
-		"agent_card":    reconciledCard,
+		"agent_card":    payload.AgentCard,
 		"delivery_mode": effectiveMode,
 	}); err != nil {
 		log.Printf("Registry broadcast error: %v", err)

workspace-server/internal/handlers/template_files_eic.go

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ package handlers
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
-	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"log"
 	"os"
@@ -358,28 +357,6 @@ func writeFileViaEIC(ctx context.Context, instanceID, runtime, root, relPath str
 		var stderr bytes.Buffer
 		sshCmd.Stderr = &stderr
 		if err := sshCmd.Run(); err != nil {
-			// When the per-op context deadline (eicFileOpTimeout) fires,
-			// exec.CommandContext SIGKILLs the ssh subprocess and Run()
-			// returns the bare "signal: killed" with empty stderr. That
-			// surfaced to the canvas as an opaque
-			// `500 {"error":"ssh install: signal: killed ()"}` which gave
-			// the operator no idea the workspace was simply mid-provision
-			// with a slow/unready EIC tunnel (internal#423). Detect the
-			// deadline explicitly and return an actionable message instead
-			// — the EIC mechanism, timeout value, and success path are all
-			// unchanged; this only improves the error a stuck write emits.
-			if cerr := ctx.Err(); cerr != nil {
-				reason := "timed out after " + eicFileOpTimeout.String()
-				if errors.Is(cerr, context.Canceled) && !errors.Is(cerr, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
-					reason = "was cancelled"
-				}
-				return fmt.Errorf(
-					"ssh install: EIC tunnel to workspace %s — "+
-						"the workspace may still be provisioning (slow/unready SSH); "+
-						"retry once it is online, or apply provider credentials via "+
-						"Settings → Secrets (encrypted, does not use this file-write path)",
-					reason)
-			}
 			return fmt.Errorf("ssh install: %w (%s)", err, strings.TrimSpace(stderr.String()))
 		}
 		log.Printf("writeFileViaEIC: ws instance=%s runtime=%s root=%s wrote %d bytes → %s",

workspace-server/internal/handlers/template_files_eic_write_timeout_test.go

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-package handlers
-
-// template_files_eic_write_timeout_test.go — pins the actionable-error
-// behavior added for internal#423.
-//
-// When the per-op context deadline (eicFileOpTimeout) fires,
-// exec.CommandContext SIGKILLs the ssh subprocess and Run() returns the
-// bare "signal: killed" with empty stderr. Before the fix that surfaced
-// to the canvas as an opaque `500 {"error":"ssh install: signal:
-// killed ()"}` — useless to an operator whose workspace was simply
-// mid-provision with a slow/unready EIC tunnel. The fix detects the
-// deadline explicitly (errors.Is(ctx.Err(), context.DeadlineExceeded))
-// and returns a message that names the cause and the
-// Settings → Secrets workaround.
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// TestWriteFileViaEIC_DeadlineExceeded_ActionableError stubs
-// withEICTunnel so the *real* inner closure runs against a context that
-// has already exceeded its deadline. The ssh subprocess fails (no real
-// sshd on the fake port) and ctx.Err() == DeadlineExceeded, so the new
-// branch must fire and produce an actionable message — NOT the opaque
-// "signal: killed ()" string the canvas used to show.
-func TestWriteFileViaEIC_DeadlineExceeded_ActionableError(t *testing.T) {
-	prev := withEICTunnel
-	withEICTunnel = func(_ context.Context, instanceID string, fn func(s eicSSHSession) error) error {
-		// Run the real inner closure. It closes over the ctx that
-		// writeFileViaEIC derived from our already-cancelled parent, so
-		// the ssh subprocess is killed immediately and ctx.Err()
-		// resolves — exactly the eicFileOpTimeout-expiry shape.
-		return fn(eicSSHSession{
-			instanceID: instanceID,
-			osUser:     "ubuntu",
-			localPort:  1, // nothing listening → ssh fails fast
-			keyPath:    "/nonexistent/key",
-		})
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() { withEICTunnel = prev })
-
-	// Drive the real writeFileViaEIC. Pass a parent whose deadline has
-	// already passed: the context.WithTimeout(ctx, eicFileOpTimeout)
-	// derived inside writeFileViaEIC inherits the expired parent
-	// deadline, so ctx.Err() == context.DeadlineExceeded by the time
-	// the killed ssh subprocess returns — the exact production shape
-	// (eicFileOpTimeout expiry), exercised deterministically.
-	parent, cancel := context.WithDeadline(context.Background(), time.Now().Add(-time.Second))
-	defer cancel()
-
-	err := writeFileViaEIC(parent, "i-test", "claude-code", "/configs", "config.yaml", []byte("model: sonnet\n"))
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected an error from a killed ssh subprocess, got nil")
-	}
-	msg := err.Error()
-
-	// Must NOT leak the opaque bare-signal string to the operator.
-	if strings.Contains(msg, "signal: killed ()") {
-		t.Fatalf("error still surfaces the opaque %q form: %q", "signal: killed ()", msg)
-	}
-	// Must name the cause and the Secrets workaround so the canvas
-	// shows something actionable.
-	for _, want := range []string{"timed out", "provisioning", "Settings", "Secrets"} {
-		if !strings.Contains(msg, want) {
-			t.Errorf("actionable error missing %q; got: %q", want, msg)
-		}
-	}
-}

workspace/executor_helpers.py

@@ -599,6 +599,28 @@ def _sanitize_for_external(msg: str) -> str:
     import re as _re
 
     msg = _re.sub(r"(?i)(?:bearer|token|api[_-]?key|sk-)[ :=]+[A-Za-z0-9_/.-]{20,}", "[REDACTED]", msg)
+    # Bare provider key with NO separator after the prefix — a real
+    # `sk-ant-api03-…` / `sk-…` key uses `-` (not `[ :=]`) so the rule
+    # above misses it. Require ≥24 key-ish chars after the `sk-`/`sk-ant-`
+    # prefix so curated examples like `sk-ant-EXAMPLE-SHORT` (13 chars
+    # after `sk-ant-`) still pass through un-redacted.
+    msg = _re.sub(r"(?i)\bsk-(?:ant-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}", "[REDACTED]", msg)
+    # JSON-quoted credential values: {"token": "…"} / {"apiKey": "…"} /
+    # {"secret": "…"} / {"password": "…"}. Redact only the value, and only
+    # when it is ≥24 chars so a short curated sample like
+    # `"api_key": "sk-ant-EXAMPLE-SHORT"` (20-char value) still passes.
+    msg = _re.sub(
+        r'(?i)("(?:token|api[_-]?key|secret|password)"\s*:\s*")[^"]{24,}(")',
+        r"\1[REDACTED]\2",
+        msg,
+    )
+    # AWS secret access key in `aws_secret_access_key=…` form (env dumps,
+    # boto tracebacks). The base64-ish value runs until whitespace/quote.
+    msg = _re.sub(
+        r"(?i)(aws_secret_access_key\s*[:=]\s*)\S+",
+        r"\1[REDACTED]",
+        msg,
+    )
     # Absolute paths: /etc/shadow, /home/user/.aws/credentials, etc.
     msg = _re.sub(r"(?:/[^/\s]+){2,}", lambda m: m.group(0) if len(m.group(0)) < 60 else "[REDACTED_PATH]", msg)
     return msg
@@ -608,6 +630,7 @@ def sanitize_agent_error(
     exc: BaseException | None = None,
     category: str | None = None,
     stderr: str | None = None,
+    reason: str | None = None,
 ) -> str:
     """Render an agent-side failure into a user-safe error message.
 
@@ -615,6 +638,18 @@ def sanitize_agent_error(
     category string (e.g. from `classify_subprocess_error`). If both are
     given, `category` wins. If neither, the tag defaults to "unknown".
 
+    When ``reason`` is provided (internal#211/#212), it is a *pre-curated,
+    user-actionable, secret-safe* explanation built by the caller from a
+    provider-side failure — e.g. a 403 "Your organization has disabled
+    Claude subscription access · Use an Anthropic API key instead, or ask
+    your admin to enable access" with error code ``oauth_org_not_allowed``.
+    This text is exactly what the user needs to self-serve, so it is
+    surfaced VERBATIM as the message instead of being collapsed to the
+    opaque exception class name. It still passes through the
+    key/token/bearer/path scrubber as a belt-and-braces second pass so a
+    buggy caller can't leak a credential that snuck into the reason.
+    ``reason`` wins over ``stderr``; both lose to neither being set.
+
     When ``stderr`` is provided (e.g. the first ~1 KB of a subprocess stderr
     or HTTP error body), it is sanitized and appended to the output so the
     A2A caller gets actionable context without needing to dig through workspace
@@ -629,6 +664,13 @@ def sanitize_agent_error(
     else:
         tag = "unknown"
 
+    if reason:
+        # Curated, user-actionable reason — surface it as the message.
+        # Still scrub: a 403/auth/quota message is safe, but the scrubber
+        # is cheap insurance against a caller that didn't curate cleanly.
+        clean = _sanitize_for_external(reason[:_MAX_STDERR_PREVIEW])
+        return f"Agent error ({tag}): {clean}"
+
     if stderr:
         # Truncate and sanitize before including — prevents DoS via
         # a malicious or buggy peer injecting a huge error body, and

workspace/tests/test_executor_helpers.py

@@ -788,6 +788,123 @@ def test_sanitize_agent_error_stderr_combined_with_existing_tests():
     assert "workspace logs" in out
 
 
+# ─── reason passthrough (internal#211/#212: surface actionable provider error) ───
+
+
+def test_sanitize_agent_error_reason_surfaced_verbatim():
+    """A curated provider reason is shown to the user, not collapsed to the
+    exception class name. This is the internal#211 regression: a 403
+    org-disabled message must reach the canvas."""
+    reason = (
+        "provider HTTP 403 — oauth_org_not_allowed — Your organization has "
+        "disabled Claude subscription access for Claude Code · Use an "
+        "Anthropic API key instead, or ask your admin to enable access"
+    )
+
+    class _ResultErr(Exception):
+        pass
+
+    out = sanitize_agent_error(exc=_ResultErr("opaque"), reason=reason)
+    # The actionable provider guidance and status code must be visible.
+    assert "403" in out
+    assert "oauth_org_not_allowed" in out
+    assert "disabled Claude subscription access" in out
+    assert "ask your admin to enable access" in out
+    # NOT the old opaque form.
+    assert "see workspace logs" not in out
+
+
+def test_sanitize_agent_error_reason_still_scrubs_secrets():
+    """Even on the reason path the key/token scrubber runs — a buggy caller
+    that lets a bearer token into the reason still gets it redacted."""
+    leaky = (
+        "provider HTTP 401 — auth failed — Authorization: Bearer "
+        "PLACEHOLDER_LONG_TOKEN_0123456789abcdefghijklm please re-auth"
+    )
+    out = sanitize_agent_error(reason=leaky)
+    assert "[REDACTED]" in out
+    assert "PLACEHOLDER_LONG_TOKEN_0123456789abcdefghijklm" not in out
+    # The non-secret guidance still survives the scrub.
+    assert "401" in out
+    assert "please re-auth" in out
+
+
+def test_sanitize_agent_error_reason_scrubs_all_secret_formats():
+    """The scrubber must redact every realistic credential shape — not just
+    the `Bearer <tok>` form the original test happened to exercise
+    (internal#212 review finding: bare `sk-ant-api03-…` keys, JSON-quoted
+    "token"/"apiKey" values, and `aws_secret_access_key=` all leaked).
+    All curated/actionable guidance must still survive the scrub.
+    """
+    # 1. Bare sk-ant-api03 key — no `[ :=]` separator after the prefix
+    #    (a real Anthropic key uses `-`), so the legacy regex missed it.
+    bare = (
+        "provider HTTP 401 — auth failed — invalid key "
+        "sk-FAKEPLACEHOLDERabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxy0123456789 "
+        "please re-auth"
+    )
+    out = sanitize_agent_error(reason=bare)
+    assert "sk-FAKEPLACEHOLDERabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxy0123456789" not in out
+    assert "[REDACTED]" in out
+    assert "401" in out  # actionable status survives
+    assert "please re-auth" in out  # actionable guidance survives
+
+    # 2. JSON-quoted "token" / "apiKey" values.
+    jblob = (
+        'provider error — config dump {"token": '
+        '"abcDEF0123456789ghIJKL0123456789mnopQRST", "apiKey": '
+        '"anon_fakefakefakefakefakefakefakefakefakefake"} — '
+        "use an API key instead"
+    )
+    out = sanitize_agent_error(reason=jblob)
+    assert "abcDEF0123456789ghIJKL0123456789mnopQRST" not in out
+    assert "anon_fakefakefakefakefakefakefakefakefakefake" not in out
+    assert "[REDACTED]" in out
+    assert "use an API key instead" in out  # actionable guidance survives
+
+    # 3. aws_secret_access_key=… form.
+    awsblob = (
+        "provider HTTP 403 — boto credential error "
+        "aws_secret_access_key=wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY — "
+        "ask your admin to enable access"
+    )
+    out = sanitize_agent_error(reason=awsblob)
+    assert "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY" not in out
+    assert "[REDACTED]" in out
+    assert "403" in out  # actionable status survives
+    assert "ask your admin to enable access" in out  # guidance survives
+
+    # 4. Regression: the original Bearer form still redacts.
+    # Uses PLACEHOLDER_LONG_TOKEN (>=40 chars, no sk-ant- prefix) to avoid
+    # triggering the secret-scan workflow pattern
+    # `sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40,}`.
+    bearer = (
+        "provider HTTP 401 — Authorization: Bearer "
+        "PLACEHOLDER_LONG_TOKEN_9876543210abcdefghij re-auth"
+    )
+    out = sanitize_agent_error(reason=bearer)
+    assert "PLACEHOLDER_LONG_TOKEN_9876543210abcdefghij" not in out
+    assert "[REDACTED]" in out
+    assert "re-auth" in out
+
+
+def test_sanitize_agent_error_reason_wins_over_stderr():
+    """When both reason and stderr are passed, the curated reason wins."""
+    out = sanitize_agent_error(
+        reason="provider HTTP 403 — use an API key",
+        stderr="raw subprocess noise that should not be shown",
+    )
+    assert "use an API key" in out
+    assert "raw subprocess noise" not in out
+
+
+def test_sanitize_agent_error_no_reason_unchanged():
+    """Omitting reason preserves the original generic behavior."""
+    out = sanitize_agent_error(exc=ValueError("boom"))
+    assert "ValueError" in out
+    assert "workspace logs" in out
+
+
 
 # ======================================================================
 # classify_subprocess_error