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Author SHA1 Message Date
core-devops d8357d8720 ci: rerun after mc#724 all-required fix lands
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2026-05-12 20:51:46 +00:00
fullstack-engineer 89b51ad3f0 test(mcp): harden RecallMemory_GlobalScope_Blocked — add OFFSEC-001 contract assertions
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Mirrors PR#680's OFFSEC-001 contract hardening from the commit-memory
path to the recall-memory path (issue #681).

Before: only asserted resp.Error != nil — a future regression that
returned the raw err.Error() would still pass the test.

After:
  - Canary tokens ("xK8mPqRwT", "zN7vLsJhYw") planted in the query
    argument: truly arbitrary strings that would appear verbatim if
    err.Error() were returned directly. Tokens chosen to not overlap
    with the legitimate error message text (which contains "GLOBAL",
    "scope", etc.) — which would always appear and make them useless
    as sentinels.
  - Exact-equality assertion: code == -32000 AND message == the
    constant defined in toolRecallMemory ("GLOBAL scope is not
    permitted via the MCP bridge — use LOCAL, TEAM, or empty").
  - Defence-in-depth strings.Contains loop: each canary token must
    not appear in the response — catches a future OFFSEC-001
    regression even if the exact-message assertion is deleted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-12 12:16:24 +00:00
+40 -1
View File
@@ -548,10 +548,28 @@ func TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_CleanContent_PassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
// tools/call — recall_memory
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// TestMCPHandler_RecallMemory_GlobalScope_Blocked verifies C3 enforcement:
// GLOBAL scope is blocked on the MCP bridge. Sibling of
// TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_GlobalScope_Blocked (#681 — mirrors PR#680's
// OFFSEC-001 contract hardening from the commit-memory path).
//
// Canary tokens are included in the arguments so a future OFFSEC-001 regression
// (err.Error() leaking into the JSON-RPC message) would be caught by the
// defence-in-depth strings.Contains guard even if the exact-message assertion
// were deleted. Per feedback_branch_count_before_approving the recall path
// must be verified independently since it flows through a different tool
// implementation (toolRecallMemory vs toolCommitMemory).
func TestMCPHandler_RecallMemory_GlobalScope_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
h, mock := newMCPHandler(t)
// No DB expectations — handler must abort before touching the DB.
// Canary tokens: truly arbitrary strings that could NOT appear in
// the error message naturally. If OFFSEC-001 regresses and the raw
// err.Error() is returned, these will appear verbatim in the response.
// Tokens chosen to not overlap with the actual error message text
// ("GLOBAL", "scope", "permitted", etc.) — which WOULD appear even
// when the scrub is correct, making them useless as sentinels.
const canary = "xK8mPqRwT zN7vLsJhYw"
w := mcpPost(t, h, "ws-1", map[string]interface{}{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 11,
@@ -559,7 +577,7 @@ func TestMCPHandler_RecallMemory_GlobalScope_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
"params": map[string]interface{}{
"name": "recall_memory",
"arguments": map[string]interface{}{
"query": "secret",
"query": canary,
"scope": "GLOBAL",
},
},
@@ -570,6 +588,27 @@ func TestMCPHandler_RecallMemory_GlobalScope_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
if resp.Error == nil {
t.Error("expected JSON-RPC error for GLOBAL scope recall, got nil")
}
// Exact-equality assertions: code == -32000 AND the constant message.
// The message must be the constant defined in toolRecallMemory, not the
// raw err.Error() value — OFFSEC-001 (#259) requires this so callers
// (including agent runtimes) cannot learn server-side details.
wantMsg := "GLOBAL scope is not permitted via the MCP bridge — use LOCAL, TEAM, or empty"
if resp.Error != nil {
if resp.Error.Code != -32000 {
t.Errorf("error code should be -32000, got %d", resp.Error.Code)
}
if resp.Error.Message != wantMsg {
t.Errorf("error message should be constant %q, got %q", wantMsg, resp.Error.Message)
}
// Defence-in-depth: canary tokens must never appear in the response.
// A future regression where err.Error() is assigned directly would
// expose these arbitrary strings verbatim in the JSON-RPC body.
for _, token := range strings.Fields(canary) {
if strings.Contains(resp.Error.Message, token) {
t.Errorf("error message should not contain canary token %q (OFFSEC-001 leak)", token)
}
}
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("unexpected DB calls on GLOBAL scope block: %v", err)
}