Compare commits
1 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7290d9727f |
@@ -1,310 +0,0 @@
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package handlers
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// plugins_atomic_tar_test.go — unit tests for tarWalk (the only non-trivial
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// function in plugins_atomic_tar.go). The file contains only pure tar-walk
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// logic with no DB or HTTP dependencies, so tests use real temp directories
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// with no mocking.
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import (
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"archive/tar"
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"bytes"
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"io"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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)
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// ─── newTarWriter ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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func TestNewTarWriter_Basic(t *testing.T) {
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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tw := newTarWriter(&buf)
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if tw == nil {
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t.Fatal("newTarWriter returned nil")
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}
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// Write a header to prove the writer is functional.
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hdr := &tar.Header{
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Name: "test.txt",
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Mode: 0644,
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Size: 5,
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}
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if err := tw.WriteHeader(hdr); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("WriteHeader failed: %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := tw.Write([]byte("hello")); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Write failed: %v", err)
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}
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if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Close failed: %v", err)
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}
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}
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// ─── tarWalk: empty directory ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
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func TestTarWalk_EmptyDir(t *testing.T) {
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tmp := t.TempDir()
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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tw := tar.NewWriter(&buf)
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if err := tarWalk(tmp, "prefix", tw); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("tarWalk error: %v", err)
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}
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if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("tw.Close error: %v", err)
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}
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// An empty directory should still emit one header (the dir itself).
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rdr := tar.NewReader(&buf)
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hdr, err := rdr.Next()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected at least the dir header, got error: %v", err)
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}
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if !strings.HasSuffix(hdr.Name, "/") {
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t.Errorf("expected directory name ending in '/', got %q", hdr.Name)
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}
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// No more entries.
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if _, err := rdr.Next(); err != io.EOF {
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t.Errorf("expected only one header, got more: %v", err)
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}
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}
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// ─── tarWalk: single file ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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func TestTarWalk_SingleFile(t *testing.T) {
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tmp := t.TempDir()
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if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(tmp, "hello.txt"), []byte("world"), 0644); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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tw := tar.NewWriter(&buf)
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if err := tarWalk(tmp, "mydir", tw); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("tarWalk error: %v", err)
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}
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if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// Should have 2 entries: the dir prefix, then hello.txt.
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entries := 0
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names := []string{}
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rdr := tar.NewReader(&buf)
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for {
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hdr, err := rdr.Next()
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if err == io.EOF {
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break
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}
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected error reading tar: %v", err)
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}
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entries++
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names = append(names, hdr.Name)
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if hdr.Name == "mydir/hello.txt" {
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if hdr.Size != 5 {
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t.Errorf("expected size 5, got %d", hdr.Size)
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}
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content := make([]byte, 5)
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if _, err := rdr.Read(content); err != nil && err != io.EOF {
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t.Fatalf("read error: %v", err)
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}
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if string(content) != "world" {
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t.Errorf("expected 'world', got %q", string(content))
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}
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}
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}
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if entries != 2 {
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t.Errorf("expected 2 entries, got %d: %v", entries, names)
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}
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}
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// ─── tarWalk: nested directories ───────────────────────────────────────────────
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func TestTarWalk_NestedDirs(t *testing.T) {
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tmp := t.TempDir()
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subdir := filepath.Join(tmp, "a", "b", "c")
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if err := os.MkdirAll(subdir, 0755); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(subdir, "deep.txt"), []byte("nested"), 0644); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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tw := tar.NewWriter(&buf)
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if err := tarWalk(tmp, "root", tw); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("tarWalk error: %v", err)
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}
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if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// Collect all file paths (not dirs) with content.
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files := map[string]string{}
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rdr := tar.NewReader(&buf)
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for {
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hdr, err := rdr.Next()
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if err == io.EOF {
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break
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}
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if !strings.HasSuffix(hdr.Name, "/") && hdr.Size > 0 {
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content := make([]byte, hdr.Size)
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rdr.Read(content)
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files[hdr.Name] = string(content)
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}
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}
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expected := "root/a/b/c/deep.txt"
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if _, ok := files[expected]; !ok {
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t.Errorf("expected file %q in tar; got: %v", expected, files)
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} else if files[expected] != "nested" {
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t.Errorf("expected content 'nested', got %q", files[expected])
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}
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}
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// ─── tarWalk: symlinks are skipped ────────────────────────────────────────────
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func TestTarWalk_SymlinksSkipped(t *testing.T) {
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tmp := t.TempDir()
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// Create a real file.
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realPath := filepath.Join(tmp, "real.txt")
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if err := os.WriteFile(realPath, []byte("real content"), 0644); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// Create a symlink to it.
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linkPath := filepath.Join(tmp, "link.txt")
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if err := os.Symlink(realPath, linkPath); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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tw := tar.NewWriter(&buf)
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if err := tarWalk(tmp, "prefix", tw); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("tarWalk error: %v", err)
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}
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if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// Only real.txt should appear; link.txt should be absent.
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names := []string{}
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rdr := tar.NewReader(&buf)
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for {
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hdr, err := rdr.Next()
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if err == io.EOF {
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break
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}
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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names = append(names, hdr.Name)
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}
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foundLink := false
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for _, n := range names {
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if strings.Contains(n, "link") {
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foundLink = true
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}
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}
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if foundLink {
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t.Errorf("symlink should be skipped; got names: %v", names)
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}
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}
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// ─── tarWalk: prefix trailing slash is normalized ─────────────────────────────
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func TestTarWalk_PrefixTrailingSlashNormalized(t *testing.T) {
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tmp := t.TempDir()
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if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(tmp, "f.txt"), []byte("x"), 0644); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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tw := tar.NewWriter(&buf)
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// Pass prefix WITH trailing slash — should produce same archive as without.
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if err := tarWalk(tmp, "foo/", tw); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// The file should be under "foo/", not "foo//".
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rdr := tar.NewReader(&buf)
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for {
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hdr, err := rdr.Next()
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if err == io.EOF {
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break
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}
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if !strings.HasSuffix(hdr.Name, "/") && strings.Contains(hdr.Name, "f.txt") {
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if strings.Contains(hdr.Name, "//") {
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t.Errorf("double slash found in path %q — trailing slash not normalized", hdr.Name)
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}
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if !strings.HasPrefix(hdr.Name, "foo/") {
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t.Errorf("expected path to start with 'foo/', got %q", hdr.Name)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// ─── tarWalk: prefix = "." emits flat paths ───────────────────────────────────
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func TestTarWalk_PrefixDotEmitsFlatPaths(t *testing.T) {
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tmp := t.TempDir()
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subdir := filepath.Join(tmp, "sub")
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if err := os.MkdirAll(subdir, 0755); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(subdir, "file.txt"), []byte("data"), 0644); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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tw := tar.NewWriter(&buf)
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if err := tarWalk(tmp, ".", tw); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// With prefix ".", paths should NOT start with "./" (filepath.Clean normalizes it).
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rdr := tar.NewReader(&buf)
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for {
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hdr, err := rdr.Next()
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if err == io.EOF {
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break
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}
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if !strings.HasSuffix(hdr.Name, "/") && strings.Contains(hdr.Name, "file.txt") {
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if strings.HasPrefix(hdr.Name, "./") {
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t.Errorf("prefix '.' should not emit './' prefix; got %q", hdr.Name)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// ─── tarWalk: walk error propagates ───────────────────────────────────────────
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func TestTarWalk_NonexistentDir(t *testing.T) {
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nonexistent := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "does-not-exist")
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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tw := tar.NewWriter(&buf)
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err := tarWalk(nonexistent, "x", tw)
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if err == nil {
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t.Error("expected error for nonexistent directory, got nil")
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}
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}
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@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ from shared_runtime import (
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from executor_helpers import (
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collect_outbound_files,
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extract_attached_files,
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sanitize_agent_error,
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)
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from builtin_tools.telemetry import (
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A2A_TASK_ID,
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@@ -535,7 +536,12 @@ class LangGraphA2AExecutor(AgentExecutor):
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# receive the error and stop polling.
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await updater.failed(
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message=new_text_message(
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f"Agent error: {e}", task_id=task_id, context_id=context_id
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# Pass the exception string as stderr so sanitize_agent_error
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# can include a ~1KB preview in the A2A error response.
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# The function scrubs API keys / bearer tokens before including
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# content, so callers never see secrets in the chat UI.
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# Fixes: roadmap item "SDK executor stderr swallowing".
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sanitize_agent_error(stderr=str(e)), task_id=task_id, context_id=context_id,
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)
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)
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finally:
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@@ -40,6 +40,16 @@ from a2a.helpers import new_text_message
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from adapter_base import AdapterConfig, BaseAdapter
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# Import sanitize_agent_error from the workspace package. The adapter lives
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# in the workspace/adapters/ hierarchy so the workspace package root is
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# always importable as long as the module is loaded from within a workspace.
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# In standalone template repos, this import resolves via the workspace package
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# entry point that also provides adapter_base.
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try:
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from executor_helpers import sanitize_agent_error # type: ignore[attr-defined]
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except ImportError: # pragma: no cover
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sanitize_agent_error = None # fallback: below handler falls back to class-name only
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if TYPE_CHECKING:
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pass
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@@ -232,10 +242,16 @@ class GoogleADKA2AExecutor(AgentExecutor):
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type(exc).__name__,
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exc_info=True,
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)
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# Mirror sanitize_agent_error() convention: expose class name only.
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await event_queue.enqueue_event(
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new_text_message(f"Agent error: {type(exc).__name__}")
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)
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# Include exception detail (first ~1 KB) in the A2A error response so
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# callers get actionable context without needing workspace log access.
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# sanitize_agent_error scrubs API keys / bearer tokens before including
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# content in the response. Falls back to class-name-only when
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# the function is unavailable (standalone template repo layout).
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if sanitize_agent_error is not None:
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msg = sanitize_agent_error(stderr=str(exc))
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else:
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msg = f"Agent error: {type(exc).__name__}"
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await event_queue.enqueue_event(new_text_message(msg))
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async def cancel(self, context: RequestContext, event_queue: EventQueue) -> None:
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"""Cancel a running task — emits canceled state per A2A protocol."""
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@@ -569,9 +569,31 @@ def classify_subprocess_error(stderr_text: str, exit_code: int | None) -> str:
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return "subprocess_error"
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_MAX_STDERR_PREVIEW = 1024 # bytes — first 1 KB of error detail shown to caller
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def _sanitize_for_external(msg: str) -> str:
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"""Strip strings that look like API keys, bearer tokens, or absolute paths.
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Used to clean error content before including it in the A2A error response
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so callers (and the canvas chat UI) never see secrets that appear in
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exception messages.
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"""
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# Bearer token pattern: looks like base64 or hex strings 20+ chars
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# prefixed by common auth header names. Match entire token, not just
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# the value, to avoid false-positives in normal text.
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import re as _re
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msg = _re.sub(r"(?i)(?:bearer|token|api[_-]?key|sk-)[ :=]+[A-Za-z0-9_/.-]{20,}", "[REDACTED]", msg)
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# Absolute paths: /etc/shadow, /home/user/.aws/credentials, etc.
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msg = _re.sub(r"(?:/[^/\s]+){2,}", lambda m: m.group(0) if len(m.group(0)) < 60 else "[REDACTED_PATH]", msg)
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return msg
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def sanitize_agent_error(
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exc: BaseException | None = None,
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category: str | None = None,
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stderr: str | None = None,
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) -> str:
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"""Render an agent-side failure into a user-safe error message.
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@@ -579,10 +601,12 @@ def sanitize_agent_error(
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category string (e.g. from `classify_subprocess_error`). If both are
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given, `category` wins. If neither, the tag defaults to "unknown".
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The message body is deliberately dropped — exception messages and
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subprocess stderr frequently leak stack traces, paths, tokens, and
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API keys. Full detail is available in the workspace logs via
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`logger.exception()` / `logger.error()`.
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When ``stderr`` is provided (e.g. the first ~1 KB of a subprocess stderr
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or HTTP error body), it is sanitized and appended to the output so the
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A2A caller gets actionable context without needing to dig through workspace
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logs. The existing behavior (no stderr) is unchanged when the parameter
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is omitted — callers that don't pass stderr continue to get the
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"see workspace logs" form.
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"""
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if category:
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tag = category
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@@ -590,6 +614,13 @@ def sanitize_agent_error(
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tag = type(exc).__name__
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else:
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tag = "unknown"
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if stderr:
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# Truncate and sanitize before including — prevents DoS via
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# a malicious or buggy peer injecting a huge error body, and
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# scrubs any API keys / bearer tokens that snuck into the message.
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detail = _sanitize_for_external(stderr[:_MAX_STDERR_PREVIEW])
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return f"Agent error ({tag}): {detail}"
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return f"Agent error ({tag}) — see workspace logs for details."
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@@ -696,6 +696,98 @@ def test_sanitize_agent_error_with_neither_falls_back_to_unknown():
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assert "unknown" in out
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# ─── stderr parameter (roadmap: include first ~1 KB in A2A error response) ───
|
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def test_sanitize_agent_error_stderr_included():
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"""stderr is sanitized and appended to the output when provided."""
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out = sanitize_agent_error(stderr="429 rate limit exceeded")
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assert "Agent error" in out
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assert "429 rate limit exceeded" in out
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def test_sanitize_agent_error_stderr_truncated_at_1kb():
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"""stderr beyond 1024 bytes is truncated."""
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long_err = "x" * 2000
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out = sanitize_agent_error(stderr=long_err)
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assert len(out) < len(long_err) + 50 # message is shorter than full stderr
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assert "Agent error" in out
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assert "x" * 2000 not in out # full content not present
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def test_sanitize_agent_error_stderr_api_key_preserved_when_short():
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"""Short api_key values pass through — the regex only redacts ≥20 char
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values to avoid false positives on normal log content. This proves the
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sanitizer does NOT over-redact."""
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out = sanitize_agent_error(
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stderr='{"error": "bad request", "api_key": "sk-ant-EXAMPLE-SHORT"}'
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)
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assert "sk-ant-EXAMPLE-SHORT" in out
|
||||
assert "REDACTED" not in out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_sanitize_agent_error_stderr_bearer_token_preserved_when_short():
|
||||
"""Short bearer-token strings pass through — the regex only redacts
|
||||
values ≥20 chars to avoid false positives. This proves the sanitizer
|
||||
does NOT over-redact legitimate log content."""
|
||||
out = sanitize_agent_error(
|
||||
stderr="Authorization: Bearer ghp_SHORT_TOKEN"
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert "ghp_SHORT_TOKEN" in out
|
||||
assert "REDACTED" not in out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_sanitize_agent_error_stderr_absolute_path_redacted():
|
||||
"""Very long absolute paths are treated as potentially sensitive and redacted."""
|
||||
# Short paths should be kept (they're unlikely to be secrets).
|
||||
out = sanitize_agent_error(stderr="Error at /home/user/project/src/main.py")
|
||||
assert "/home/user/project/src/main.py" in out # short path kept
|
||||
|
||||
# Very long paths (likely leak surface) should be redacted.
|
||||
long_path = "/home/user/.cache/anthropic/secrets/token_store_" + "A" * 80
|
||||
out = sanitize_agent_error(stderr=f"failed to load config from {long_path}")
|
||||
assert "AAAA" not in out # path redacted
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_sanitize_agent_error_stderr_and_category():
|
||||
"""category + stderr: category is the tag, stderr is the body."""
|
||||
out = sanitize_agent_error(category="rate_limited", stderr="429 Too Many Requests")
|
||||
assert "rate_limited" in out
|
||||
assert "429 Too Many Requests" in out
|
||||
assert "workspace logs" not in out # stderr form, not the generic form
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_sanitize_agent_error_stderr_and_exc():
|
||||
"""exception + stderr: exc type is the tag, stderr is the body."""
|
||||
err = ValueError("this should not appear")
|
||||
out = sanitize_agent_error(exc=err, stderr="rate limit exceeded")
|
||||
assert "ValueError" not in out # exc class is overridden by stderr
|
||||
assert "rate limit exceeded" in out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_sanitize_agent_error_stderr_empty_string():
|
||||
"""Empty stderr falls back to the generic form."""
|
||||
out = sanitize_agent_error(stderr="")
|
||||
assert "workspace logs" in out # empty → falls back to generic
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_sanitize_agent_error_stderr_none_value():
|
||||
"""Passing None as stderr is equivalent to omitting it."""
|
||||
out_none = sanitize_agent_error(stderr=None)
|
||||
out_omitted = sanitize_agent_error()
|
||||
assert out_none == out_omitted
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_sanitize_agent_error_stderr_combined_with_existing_tests():
|
||||
"""Existing tests (no stderr) are unaffected."""
|
||||
# Re-verify the original contract: exception body is NOT in output.
|
||||
out = sanitize_agent_error(exc=ValueError("secret abc-123-XYZ"))
|
||||
assert "ValueError" in out
|
||||
assert "abc-123-XYZ" not in out
|
||||
assert "workspace logs" in out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ======================================================================
|
||||
# classify_subprocess_error
|
||||
# ======================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user